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I. INTRODUCrION
It was, to put it mildly, a disaster-35,000 demonstrators and 600 arrests; at
least $3,000,000 in vandal damage; state troopers and the National Guard called in
to reinforce 4,000 overwhelmed city police, whose chief later resigned in shame.
Even worse than the physical damage to the city of Seattle was the damage to the
reputation of the United States as host to the Third Ministerial Conference of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO planned the Third Ministerial
Conference to inaugurate a Millennium Round of trade negotiations. Now, the
Millennium Round has aborted, the momentum of trade liberalization has slowed
almost to a halt, and the forces of protectionism are on the prowl.
The disaster so shocked the WTO delegates that they are having difficulty
imagining it could have any positive results. However, with the perspective of time,
the delegates may come to see a few. One benefit is that U.S. citizens are now more
aware of the WTO. The WTO is a powerful framework of international law that
touches the everyday life of each U.S. citizen. In addition, the United States was the
principal actor in the half century of international trade relationships that created the
WTO. But before the Seattle disaster, the average U.S. citizen did not realize that
the WTO existed, much less what it was about. A review of the half century of trade
relationships and the framework it created can serve as a guide to the lessons that
can be learned from the disaster in Seattle.
II. Two INCOMPLETE TRIANGLES
The history of the WTO is a tale of two triangles, each of them incomplete: a
triangle of the past and a triangle of the present.
A. The Triangle of the Past
The incomplete triangle of the past was the grand triangle of world governance
that the United States and its allies tried to create in order to hold their shattered
world together after World War II. The first side of that triangle is the United
Nations, for peace-keeping. The second side consists of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund for international finance. Finally, the third side was
supposed to be an International Trade Organization (ITO) to regulate transnational
commerce. The first two sides of the triangle were assembled, but the third side was
left incomplete, primarily as a result of the United States' defection.
In 1947, the United States and other trading nations came up with a master
agreement on transnational commerce, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GAT). The GATT countries needed an organization to administer the agreement,
so in 1948 they met in Havana and agreed to create the ITO. Unfortunately, the U.S.
Congress had other ideas. Congress thought that the United States joined too many
international organizations and criticized the GA.T Agreement as then written.
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Thus, the GATT Agreement was amended, and the ITO never came up for
Congressional vote. The GATT Agreement was left without an organization to
administer it.
GATT limped along that way for nearly half a century as an agreement without
an organization. GATT proceeded to act like an organization, however, with GATT
nations calling themselves GATT "members," as though they belonged to an
organization. But in reality, GATT was merely an agreement, and no organization
actually existed to regulate the world's transnational commerce.
Transnational commerce flourished, nonetheless, and with that flourishing came
five decades of initiatives, confrontations, negotiations, and compromises that the
GATT nations facilitated, as best they could, in the context of a non-organizational
GATT. This led to further GAT1 amendments. For the GATT nations who were
willing to open up their trade more, the result was side agreements called the GATr
"Codes." All the while, GATT remained a mere agreement; the third side of the
grand triangle of world-governance was still not in place.
Nevertheless, GATT kept plugging along, and the GATT nations grew in
number from 23 in 19471 to 129 at the VTO's inception in 1995.2 As their numbers
grew, the GATT nations tackled many problems of world trade. First, they tackled
nuts-and-bolts problems like import duties and customs valuation. Then, the GATT
nations took on more complicated problems like antidumping, countervailing duties,
and government procurement. These were mainly addressed with the GATT Codes.
The more ambitious GATT Codes laid the foundation for the Uruguay
Round-eight long years of negotiations that elevated the relationship of the GATT
nations from parties to an agreement to members of an organization. In 1995, with
the creation of the WTO, the incomplete triangle of the past was completed. The
third side of the grand triangle of world governance was, at last, in place.
B. The Triangle of the Present
The three sides of the present triangle are those sectors of transnational
commerce addressed by the WTO. The first sector is transnational commerce in
tangible goods. GATT covered this sector, and by assuming GATT's functions the
WTO solidly installed the first side of its triangle. The second sector is transnational
commerce in intellectual property, an innovation of the Uruguay Round. Although
the WTO has only recently begun addressing this sector, its authority to do so is
clear, and the second side of the triangle is established. The WTO calls the third
sector transnational commerce in "services," but lawyers refer to it as transnational
"investment." In this sector the WTO's authority is not fully articulated, and its
1. See loHN .LACISON, T*HsWoRLDTRADiNGSYSTEM40 (2ded. 1997).
2. See BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KOSrECKI, THE POLMICAL ECONOMY OFTHE WORLD TRADING
SYsTaM 1. Annex 1 (1995) [hereinafter HOEKMANIKOSTECKI].
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performance has just begun. Consequently, the third side of the WTO triangle is not
yet firmly in place.
II. THE ACHVEMENTS
During the last half century of trade relationships, the achievements of GATT
and the WTO came in three phases: reducing conventional trade barriers, regulating
trade retaliations, and expending the concept of "trade."
A. Reducing Conventional Trade Barriers
In its first phase, GATT was quite successful in reducing conventional trade
barriers. GAIT simplified inspection procedures, standardized rules of origin, and,
most importantly, lowered import duties. By 1995, when WTO was formed, the
average import duty its developed country members imposed on industrial goods
was only 6.3 percent, and they-promised to reduce that to 3.9 percent within five
years? Compared to the high rates those countries were charging in the 1930s, these
low import duty rates are impressive.
The less-developed WTO members are also reducing their import duty rates, but
at a slower pace. Additionally, all WTO members have promised to open up to
agricultural and textile products by replacing their import quotas with diminishing
import duty rates.4
B. Regulating Trade Retaliations
In its second phase, GATr started trying to regulate trade retaliations. This
proved to be a much more difficult phase.
"Trade retaliations" are administrative weapons aimed at imports: for example,
antidumping,' countervailing duties,6 safeguards, 7 and Uncle Sam's accusatory
section 301.8
3. SeeJPYLSCHOrTiEURuaUAYROUND:ANAssEsSMENr1S2(nst. forlnt'lEeon. 1994);cf.TUM
NEw GATT 2 (Susan M. Collins & Barry P. Bosworth eds., ThIe Broldngs Institution 1994) [hereInafter
Colfins/Bosworth].
4. See ScHamr. supra note 3. at 147-51.
5. Penalty duties are imposed on imports that come in at lower than source country prices. See infra Pat
M.B.1.
6. Penalty duties are imposed to offset source country subsidies. See infra Part m.B.2.
7. The importing country can renege on promised access if too many imports start coming in. See infra Part
ILI.B.3.
8. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
276
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1. Antidumping
Antidumping began in 1916 with the first U.S. antidumping statute,9 and as of
1991, the United States had "imposed more dumping penalties.. . than ... any
other government in the world."1' Now, more than forty countries have antidumping
laws," and antidumping has become a weapon of retaliation all over the world. In
the early 1960s, GAIT countries initiated less than twelve antidumping
investigations per year.12 Between 1985 and 1992, however, this number increased
to 1,040.'3
Over the years, GAIT and the WTO have moderated antidumping significantly.
The original GAIT Agreement imposed a "material injury" test, which meant that
a GATr nation could not impose antidumping duties on GAIT-source imports
without showing that the imports hurt some domestic industry. GAIT's
Antidumping Codes followed, elaborating on this requirement. Currently a WTO
agreement 14 imposes additional limitations. For example, an antidumping
investigation requires the support of a certain percentage of the affected domestic
industry. In addition, antidumping penalties cannot be used to correct minor price
differentials, and once antidumping penalties are imposed, they are supposed to end
after fixed terms.
2. Countervailing Duties
The same pattern has developed in countervailing duties. The United States
invented countervailing duties in 189715 and has vigorously imposed them ever
since. Although other countries now have similar laws on their books and have
begun to bring actions under these laws, "the United States is the only country in the
world that has extensively used countervailing duties.
'16
The original GATEAgreementrestrictedtheimposition of countervailing duties
with a "material injury" test. Subsequently, a GAIT Subsidies Code further
restricted the use of countervailing duties. Finally, a WTO agreement17 limits them
further. This trend is similar to antidumping.
9. See AmESBOVARD, T71FAiRTRADEFRAuD 110 (SL Martins Press 1991).
10. rd. at 107.
11. See ScOrr, supra note 3, at 78.
12. See id.
13. See HoEKMANO SKo , supmr note 2, at 172.
14. See Agrnient on mplementation ofArticle VI of GATrDec. I5, 1993, GATrMULtzLnATmTRA E
NEGorIATIONs: mm URUGUAY ROUND FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULT.ATRMALTRADE NEGOTIAONS (1994).
15. See JACKSON. supra note 1. at 285.
16. Id. a1281.
17. See Agreementon Subsidies andCountervailingMeasures, Dec.15,1993, GATrMuLI .RALTRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE URUGUAY ROUND FINAL ACr EMBODYIG THE RESULTS OF TmE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTU.ATERAitADENEGOTIAMONS (1994).
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3. Safeguards
The United States created safeguards in 1943 while negotiating a trade
agreement with Mexico 8 and later added them to the U.S. Code as section 201
procedures. 19 The original GAIT Agreement and now a WTO agreement' restrain
present day use of safeguards.
4. Section 301
More confrontational than safeguards are procedures by which one nation
formally accuses another of unfair trade practices and threatens to retaliate if the
misbehaving nation does not stop. The United States has used these procedures
aggressively, both to reduce imports into the United States and to achieve greater
access for U.S. exports abroad.
The most notorious example is section 301, under which the U.S. government
makes unfair trade accusations on its own initiative or at the request of private U.S.
groups2 Section 301 is another U.S. invention, and until 1984 "was virtually unique
in the world";.2 it "is to many countries the classic symbol of American
unflateralism."'
By threatening retaliation under section 301, the United States was frequently
able to persuade another nation or its industries to agree to limit their exports or
accept U.S. exports. Examples are the arrangements between the United States and
Japan that restricted the export of Japanese cars to the United States. Now, a WTO
agreement regulates such arrangements, requires old ones to be phased out, and
limits the duration of new ones. Nevertheless, section 301 still authorizes the U.S.
President to make such arrangements, whether they meet WTO requirements or
not.
18. See JACKSON. supra note 1, at 179.
19. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994).
20. See Agreement on Safeguards, Dec. 15, 1993, GAIT MUlTILATERAL TRADE NE.OniATIONS: THE
URUGUAY ROUND RNAL Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MULTIATERAL TRADE
NEGOiAIA ONS (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards].
21. See generally C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 209 (1997) (providing a masterful analysis
of the use of § 301 through the Uruguay Round).
22. JACKsON, supra note 1, at 129.
23. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., U.S. Institutions, Not the VITO, May Hold the Answer, in TUB WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: MULTHATIAERALFRAMEWORKFORTHE21STCENTuRYANDU.S. MPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 725,
742 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1996).
24. See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 20, at 1.
25. See generally Daniel Ptizin & Gary G. Yerkey. WITO Panel Says Section 301 Provisions Compatible
With the Multilateral Trade Rules, 17 INT'TRADEREP. 6 (2000) (reporting conflicts between U.S. statutory time
limitsfor§ 301 actions andwTO regulations). Ina recentWTO proceeding, the European Communities contended
that U.S. statutory time limits for § 301 actions arc inconsistent with the dispute resolution time-frame of the WTO
Dispute Resolution Understanding. See id The WTO Dispute Settlement Body affirmed a holding that the United
278
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C. Expanding the Concept of "Trade"
Two policy objectives, reducing conventional trade barriers and regulating trade
retaliations, were in the mainstream of GAITs historic objective of freer
transnational commerce in tangible goods. Three of the new WTO agreements fall
outside of that mainstream. These new agreements address transnational commerce
in two new sectors, intellectual property and what the WTO calls "services" but
lawyers call "investment."
1. Intellectual Property
In recent years, the United States has become the world's most zealous
champion of intellectual property. Defensively, the United States uses section 337
proceedings26 to exclude and seize goods that infringe U.S. intellectual property.
Offensively, it uses section 301 (and section 301's descendants, "Super-301" and
specifically "Special 301") to threaten trade retaliation against nations that deny
intellectual property rights to U.S. persons.
The WTO's intellectual property agreement is the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). TRIPs obligates WTO members to
enact and enforce national intellectual property laws that meet international
standards, and to police their borders against the importation of counterfeit goods.
2. Investment
Effectuating the transition from tangible goods to intellectual property was abig
step, but the WTO seems to have made it successfully. The shift from intellectual
property to investment is an even bigger step, and it is too early to tell whether the
WTO will be able to make this step or not. In the investment arena, the Uruguay
Round produced two new agreements, TRIMs (the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures) and GATS (the General Agreement on Trade in Services), but
the name of each is a bit deceptive.
States is exonerated by its Statement of Administration Action (submitted by President Clinton and approved by
the U.S. Congress), which states that WO-related actions under § 301 will be "based" on VITO procedures. See
Id.; see also Scan D. Murphy, WTO Upholds U.S. Section 301 Trade Authority as GA l- Consistent, 94 AM. J.I'L
L.348, 376 (2000); see also Ewel E. Murphy, Jr., Between Washington and the WTO, 9 IDWLQ. 610, 617 (1997)
(discussing therelationshipbetweenU.S. legisltonandU.S. obligationsunderVITO agreements);seealsoTrence
P. Stewart. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: An Overview of Major Issues and Potential Trouble Spots, inTHE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MuLTATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR T-E 21sr CENTuRY AND U.S. IMPLEMENMXo
LEISLATION 29, 33 (rerenceP. Stewart ed. 1996); seealso AmeliaPorges, TheMarrakeshAgreementEstablshing
the World Trade Organization, in TiE WORLD TRADE ORGANZAION: MULTIA1AL FRAMEWORK FORm E21s
CENTURY AND U.S. IPLEmeNNG LEGISLAtmoN 63, 87-88 (Ternce P. Stewart ed. 1996); see also
Collins/Bosworth, supra note 3, at 74-75.
26. TaiffAct of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(1999).
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TRIMs sounds like an investment agreement, but it is actually aimed at trade.
By TRIMs, WTO members promise each other that, in regulating the admission of
foreign investment, they will not impose conditions that hamper trade.
GATS sounds like a trade agreement, but it is aimed at investment. Under
GATS, WTO members can negotiate reciprocal access for "services" in agreed
sectors of industry. GATS defines "services" broadly enough to include investments
such as buying and establishing banks and insurance companiesY
Can the WTO effectively improve access for transnational investment? In
pursuing that goal, should WTO members continue to proceed obliquely by means
of the WTO's present authority over "services," or should they call a spade a spade
and explicitly expand the WTO's authority to include "investment"? Only time will
tell which course is more effective, and whether either course can fit the missing
third side of the WTO triangle firmly into place.
Two agreements negotiated under GATS are encouraging. The first, the
Telecommunications Agreement, was signed on February 15, 1997 by sixty-nine
WTO members representing ninety percent of all global communications. The
Telecommunications Agreement, subject to ratifications, promised reciprocal
telecommfinications access beginningin 1998.2 On December 13, 1997, 102 WTO
members signed the second agreement. The Financial Services Agreement, also
subject to ratifications, promised reciprocal access forbanking, insurance, securities
and other financial operations, beginning in 1999.29
IV. MAKING IT WORK
The obligations of WTO members to each other are expressed in some twenty
agreements. Most of these agreements ["multilateral" agreements], in principle, bind
all WTO members. The remainder ("plurilateral" agreements] bind only those
members that choose to sign.
Each of these WTO agreements is innovative compared to pre-GATr trade
relationships, but the most innovative is the multilateral agreement that enforces the
others-theDispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).4°Before the Uruguay Round,
27. SeeJACKSON,supra note 1, at 309-10 (noting that "when one examines the actual text of the GATS, it
is easy to see a number of clauses which in fact relate to investment, to the extent that sometimes persons have
suggested that the agreement is actually an 'investors' agrement."). Thus, Article 1(2) defines "services" as "tIh
supply ofa service"; Articlel(3)(b) defines"services" to include "any service in any sectorexceptservices supplied
in the exercise of a governmental authority"; and Articles XVI and XVII, respectively, promise reciprocal market
access and national treatment for "services and service supplier ."
28. See RossellaBrevetti, Telecommunications: USTRNotesExpectedP rgressinMexco'slmplementaton
of Telecom Act, 161 I'r'LTADEREP. 1277, 1277 (2000).
29. SeeDanielPuzin, WTOFinancialServicesPacttoEnterinto ForceMarch 1,16 IT'LTRAD)EREP.265,
265 (1999) (noting thit the Financial Services Agreement became effective March 1, 1999, even though 18
ratifications were still pending).
30. See generamly Understanding on Rules and Pracedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (visited
Sept. 24, 2000) <http-//www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-eldispu-ctdsu-e.hnn>.
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a trade dispute between GATT nations was resolved ultimately by "consensus:' In
other words, when the dispute-resolution procedure resulted in a decision, that
decision was binding only if approved by a consensus of the GATT nations that
chose to vote. Consequently, the GATT nation facing a negative outcome of its case
could veto the decision. The DSU reversed the "consensus" rule; a decision is now
binding unless disapproved by a consensus of WTO members.
Nonetheless, the WTO's mechanism for enforcing DSU decisions is less
coercive than thecivil or criminaljustice of anation-state. The WTO does not award
damages or collect fines. If a losing nation fails to implement the
"recommendations" of the deciding panel, the winning nation's ultimate recourse
is to suspend WTO benefits that the winner otherwise owes the loser 1 In other
words, the winner's ultimate remedy is authorized self-help.
Each year DSU proceedings are increasingly instituted. In 1995, there were
approximately twenty new DSU cases. In 1996, new cases numbered in the forties.
In 1997, more than fifty new cases were initiated. Finally, in 1998, more than one
hundred new cases were instituted? 2 The United States has brought more DSU cases
than any other WTO member. As of March 1999, the United States had brought
forty-four, and had twenty-nine pending-twenty as claimant and nine as
respondent 3 From the beginning, the U.S. win-lose ratio has been high. In early
1998, for example, the United States boasted seventeen DSU wins to only one loss 4
Most DSU cases are not front-page news, but some attract strong public interest.
Among well-known U.S. wins are the cases against the European Union for
discriminating against Western Hemisphere bananas 35 and hormone-treated U.S.
beef,36 and against Canada for discriminating against advertising in Canadian issues
of U.S. magazines3 7 Among well-known U.S. defeats are the case lost to India and
others for prohibiting importation of shrimp caught in nets that trap turtles,"8 and the
31. See id.atArt.22.2.
32. See The WIO Crunch!, THE EcooMwS, Apr. 4. 1998, at 78.
33. See Gary G.Yerkey, U.S. Using WTO Dispute Resolution FarMoreAggressvely Than OtherCounries,
16 IDWLTADE REP. 540,540 (1999).
34. See Alan Stowell, Growing Use of WTO Dispute Panels Could Strain Resources, Symposium Told, I5
INT'LTRAflR REP. 341,341 (1998).
35. See RossellaBrevetti, WTO Appellate Body Affinns U.S. Wctory in Banana Dispute with EU, 14 ,NT'L
TRADE REP. 1518, 1518 (1997).
36. See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTOApproves U.S., Canada Sanctions on EUof $124.5 Million
In BeefHormone Dispute, I6 INT'LrADEREP. 1158,1158 (1999).
37. See WTOAppellateBodyAffrmsRulingAgainstCanadainMagazne Case, 14INT'LTRADEREP. 1145,
1145 (1997).
38. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Formally Adopts Shrimp-Turtle Ruling as Thailand Fears Victory May be
Pyrrhic, 15 INT'L TRADm REP. 1884, 1884 (1998); see also Stan D. Murphy, U.S. Implementation of WTO
Turtle/Shrimp Decision,94 AM..INT"LL.348,361 (2000) (reviewing the WTO ruling prohibiting import ofshimp
caught in turtle traps).
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case lost to Venezuela and Brazil for a U.S. environmental regulation that
discriminated against imported gasoline.
39
A recent DSU victory for the European Union over the United States has upset
not only major U.S. industries, but the U.S. Congress itself. In February 2000, the
WTO Appellate Body affirmed that the Foreign Sales Corporation provisions of the
U.S. Internal Revenue Code violate WTO rules against export subsidies.4 At stake
in this dispute are income tax benefits that saved U.S. companies between $1.8 and
$2.25 billion during fiscal year 1999.!1 Absent a settlement, the alternatives are
grim: either the U.S. Congress repeals the pertinent provisions, or the European
Union can impose comparable penalties on U.S. exports.
This prickly problem comes at a sensitive crossroad of U.S. relations with the
WTO. The statute by which the United States joined the WTO42 requires the U.S.
Trade Representative to submit to the U.S. Congress, at five-year intervals, a report
on "the value of the continued participation of the United States in the WTO."' 3 Any
member of the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives may introduce a joint
resolution within ninety days after such a report is submitted. If jointly passed and
reaffirmed over Presidential veto, the resolution would withdraw the United States
from the WTO.M On March 2, 2000, the U.S. Trade Representative submitted the
first report, concluding that U.S. withdrawal from the WTO would be
"unthinkable." 5 Submission of the report started the ninety-day period running at
a time when Congress is scheduled to decide whether to facilitate the admission of
China to the WTO by granting China permanent "normal trade relations" with the
United States." Few observers predict that Congress will vote to withdraw the
United States from the WTO, but the stakes are enormous and emotions are tense.
V. THE REVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION
The WTO's world-encompassing framework of trade agreements was not
constructed in a vacuum. It responded to a basic change in the world itself.
39.. SeeRossellaBrevettiAppelluaeBodyFaults U.S. in Gas Case, butReverses on Conversaton Exvceptlon,
13 IT'LtTRADEREP. 703,703 (1996).
40. See Joseph Kahn, U.S. Loses Dispute on Exports Sales, N.Y. TIMm, Feb. 24,2000. at Al; see also
Daniel Pruzin, WTOAppellate Body Upholds Key Finding ofRuling the U.S. FSC's Constitutes Subsidy, 17 INT'L
TRADE REP. 359,359 (2000).
41. See DavidIvanovich. WTO RulingAgainst TaxBreakfor U.. ExportersRasesRuckus, HuS.CHRON.,
Mar. 1, 2000, at 1.
42. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (2000).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 3535.
44. See id.
45. Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Sends Report to Congress Urging Continued U.. Participation in W71, 17
IN"L TzADE REP. 394, 394 (2000).
46. See Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Lott Plans to Delay WTO Vote Until After Senate Considers NTR for China.
17 INT'LTRADE REP. 442,442 (2000).
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People today live in the whirlwind of a great revolution. The world is changing
faster than statistics can record, more radically than words can describe. The
economic factors of existence-what people consume and produce, and how people
make a living-are expanding beyond national borders in world-encompassing
dimensions. It is the revolution of economic globalization.
A few decades ago, transnational commerce was chiefly the movement of
tangible goods, sold in the pattern of "ship-and-forget": the exporter would sell at
the port of export, receive the purchase price, and not venture into the distribution
or finance of these goods in the target country. Usually the goods were produced for
sale domestically, and their export was merely incidental. Exports wereforeign icing
on the domestic cake.
In the twenty-first century, the "ship-and-forget" trading pattern is ancient
history. Now, products are designed, manufactured, and trademarked for particular
markets, either domestic or foreign, while their design, component production, and
assembly are outsourced globally. Exporters maintain massive transnational systems
of production and distribution protected by intricate worldwide networks of
intellectual property and financed by loans and securities offerings at home and
abroad. Exports are not merely incidental to domestic sales, but have firm bottom-
line objectives of their own. Even within its own domestic market, the value of a
product is contingent upon its resistance to competition from imports.
The revolution of economic globalization is proceeding at rapid speed. During
the last decade, compared with the growth of the world's domestic production,
merchandise exports grew twice as fast, transnational investment three times as fast,
and cross-border securities sales ten times as fast47 In 1950, world exports amounted
to 7 percent of gross domestic product, and by 1995 they reached 15 percent 4
Annual trading in foreign exchange zoomed from $15 billion in 1973 to $1.2 trillion
in 1995.
Economic globalizationhas many accelerators, but two are especially powerful.
One is the sophistication of technology. In the past, the goods that moved in
transnational commerce were chiefly blue-collar, primary products such as
foodstuffs, fuels, minerals, and metals. Now, transnational commerce goods are
increasingly high-tech manufactures, white-collar services, and intellectual property
rights. Among Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries,
the cost of labor is now only 5 percent to 10 percent of the cost of production, down
from 25 percent in the 1970s0 In 1996, the world's trade in commercial services
equaled about one-fourth of its trade in tangible goods5
47. See One World?, 'TaEcoosr Oct. 18, 1997, at 79.
48. See Trade Winds, INrEcomowsr, Nov. 8,1997, at 85.
49. See One World, supra note 47, at 80.
50. See Worldbeater, Ina,THBECONOMISr, Nov. 22, 1997, at93 [hereinafter Worldbeater].
51. See Trade Wnds, supra note 48, at 86.
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The second powerful accelerator of economic globalization is the pervasiveness
of transnationalinvestment. In 1995, gross salesbyforeign affiliates of transnational
enterprises were greater than the total exports of the world, and the foreign sales of
those affiliates were growing 20 percent to 30 percent faster than their parents' sales
at home 2 Seventy percent of all transnational technology royalties now involve
payments between parent firms and their foreign affiliates.
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VI. SEATTLE'S TWO CONFRONTATIONS
A. The Messenger and the Message
The WTO did not cause the revolution of economic globalization. It was the
other way around-the revolution created the WTO. The WTO is the framework
trading nations constructed to face the revolution, to channel the revolution's energy
in manageable directions, and to discipline the trade retaliations the revolution
provokes. The WTO comes to the inhabitants of the globalizing world as a
messenger, warning that economic globalization is happening and offering to be a
guide through the revolutionary storm by serving as the mechanism to help nations
most effectively face the revolution, channel its energy, and discipline the resulting
trade retaliations.
As a messenger, WTO warns: 'World inhabitants, wake up! Your technology,
investment flow and appetite for consuming each others' goods are making your
world a more intrusive and contentious place to live. The revolution of economic
globalization has begun. Your nations have been trying to cope with that revolution
for more than fifty years, and have made some agreements to adjust your world to
the revolution. I am WTO, the organization your nations formed to administer those
agreements. You must make your nations perform those agreements and face the
revolution together. If they go back to the old restrictions and retaliations of their
pre-GAIT days, it will be every nation for itself, and the revolution will shake up
you inhabitants even more."
Many world inhabitants do not like this message. It offends those who would
rather pretend that there is no revolution of economic globalization. Others
acknowledge the revolution, but do not trust an international organization to address
it. Some people are upset because they are frightened by some results of the
revolution and believe that those results can be cured without addressing the
revolution itself.
In Seattle, the people who heard the WTO's message responded as people often
do when hearing a message they do not like. Some disputed the message while
others attacked the messenger. The message-disputers were the delegates of some
52. See Worldbeater, supra note 50, at 92.
53. See i.
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of the 135 WTO member nations. Behind closed doors, they argued for changes in
the substance of the WTO-administered trade agreements and methods used to
administer them. The messenger-attackers demonstrated in the streets. Amid tear-gas
and television cameras, they shrieked for the destruction of the WTO itself. Taken
together, these two confrontations produced the disaster of Seattle.
B. Disputing the Message
I
The confrontation behind closed doors was between the competing national
interests of WTO members. The United States and other exporters of farm products
opposed agricultural protectionism, most notably by the European Union. The
United States and other capital-exporting members pressed for more investment
access while some less-developed members resisted. Many less-developed members
also demanded more time to meet the costly requirements of the Uruguay Round,
such as amending their intellectual property laws to comply with TRIPs. Less-
developed members generally resented what they perceived as domination of the
WTO by their more affluent peers. Many members sought moderation of
antidumping and other U.S. trade retaliations.
Among the more sensitive issues was the conditioning of trade access on labor
and environmental standards. The United States asked the WTO to form a Working
Group on Trade and Labor.M In an interview with a Seattle newspaper, President
Clinton pressed further by saying that eventually there should be trade sanctions to
enforce core labor rights around the world.55 This enraged many of the WTO
members, especially the less-developed nations.
C. Attacking the Messenger
The confrontation in the streets covered a broader spectrum of issues, but labor
and the environment were again prominent. Demonstrators shouted that trade access
should be conditioned on labor rights, that the WTO should conduct its proceedings
more openly, and that the WTO should not restrict a member's environmental
regulation (as by the DSU award against U.S. rejection of shrimp caught in turtle-
harmful nets).
54. See generally U.S. Ptoposalfora WTO Working Group on Trade and Labor, Released Nov. 1,1999,
16 INT'L TRADE REP. 1806 (1999) (reproducing the text of the U.S. request); see also Seattle Ministerial and
Beyond: A Long. Wind'ng Roadfor the W71% 16 ItLTRADEREP. 1975 (1999) (analyzing key issues the WTO
faced in Seattle).
55. See Steven Greenhouse & Joseph Kahn, Talk and Turmoil: Workers' Rights; US.. Effort to Add Labor
Standards to Agenda Falls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at Al; see also Steven Greenhouse, After Seattle, Unions
Point to Sustained Fight on Trade, N.Y. TIM ES, Dec. 6, 1999, at A28.
56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (referring to the DSU award againstTU.S. rejection of shrimp
caught in turtle-hurming nets).
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Some speakers threatened the WTO as an institution. James Hoffa, the
Teamsters president, said, 'We're going to change WTO or we're going to get rid
of WTO.:'' AU.S. commentator observed, "What's crazy is that the protesters want
the W.T.O. to become precisely what they accuse it of already being-a global
government. They want it to set more rules-their rules, which would impose our
labor and environmental standards on everyone else."58
Other demonstrators denounced globalization itself as "purely and simply away
for capitalists to exploit the world's workers."59 The President of Mexico, Ernesto
Zedillo, called such demonstrators "globophobics-acurious alliance of forces from
the extreme left, environmentalists and other self-appointed critics in a common
endeavor to save the people of developing countries from development." 6 Michael
Moore, the WTO's Director-General, wryly observed, "Globalization is the new
'ism' that everyone loves to hate. '61
VII. CONCLUSION
In the end, there was no beginning. The Seattle conference did not commence
a Millennium Round. When the WTO's General Council met a month later in
Geneva, it merely affirmed the Uruguay Round commitment to re-open negotiations
on agriculture and services later in 2000.62
What lessons can be learned from the disaster of Seattle? Four suggestions
follow:
(1) Economic globalization benefits most people, but in particular nations
and particular population groups within a nation, it causes economic
and emotional insecurity--"rising income inequality, job insecurity in
a rapidly changing and harshly competitive environment, and a sense
of powerlessness and uncertainty about the future." 6
Paul Krugman described the anomaly well: "The reality is that
globalization makes the world a richer place, but the wealth it creates
goes disproportionately to two sorts of people. On one side are those
who benefit from vastly improved access to technology and
57. Clay Robinson & Martin Crutsinger, Protests Disrupt World Trade Talks; Seattle Imposes Curfew to
HaltAnti.WTO Riots, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 1, 1999, at IA.
58. 'Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: Senseless in Seattle, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 1, 1999, at A31.
59. Paul Krugman, Reckonings: The Magic Mountain, N.Y. 71m, Jan. 23, 2000, at 15.
60. Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: 1 Davos, 3 Seattles, N.Y.TIMs, Feb. 1. 2000, at A25.
61. Joseph Kahn, Swiss Forum Has Its Focus On Memories From Seattle, N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 29, 2000, at B 1.
62. See Elizabeth Olson, After Seattle, Trade Group Scales Back Its Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2000, at
C4.
63. W. Bowman Cutter et aL,New Worl4 New Deal, FOREiN AFFAiRS, MarJApr. 2000, at 97 therelnafler
Cutter]; see also DAm1 RoDRK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (Inst. Int'l Econ. 1997) (providing an
evaluation of globalization's impact on job insecurity).
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capital-which is to say, workers in developing countries. On the other
are those in advanced countries who, directly or indirectly, have
technology and capital to sell-which means the rich and the highly
educated. Largely left out of the party, possibly even made worse off,
are those who fall into neither category."
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(2) The insecurity that globalization causes fuels a backlash of
protectionism. By attacking international trade agreements and the
WTO, on which management of that liberalization depends, this
backlash impedes the liberalization of transnational trade and
investment.
The backlash attacks international trade agreements by insisting that
trade access should be conditioned on labor, environmental, and other
standards dictated by the trade-receiving nation. In the words of a labor
leader, "After Seattle, the demand for labor rights and other social
standards can no longer be ignored.... Attention will turn to national
and local politics; opposition to trading accords will build; and support
for protection and subsidy will increase. Companies will find
themselves increasingly vulnerable to exposure and embarrassment and
to consumer boycotts and worker protests."' 6
The backlash attacks the WTO by insisting that its procedures be
opened to the public and less dominated by its more affluent member-
nations.
(3) To avoid a breakdown of the global economy, the world's trading
nations must address this backlash both domestically and
internationally. Domestically, every nation must find practical ways to
alleviate the insecurity of its citizens, as by providing better education,
more effective job retraining and unemployment compensation, and
health and pension coverage that employees can take from job to job.
Internationally, member-nations of the WTO must learn to resolve their
trade disputes less contentiously, to improve the WTO's policy-making
64. Krugman, supra note 59.
65. Jay Mazur, Labor's New Internationalism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.JFeb. 2000, at 92; cf. Cutter, supra
note 63, at 94-95.
[U'ising the WTO as the forum for multilateral environmental negotiations both endangers further trade
liberalization and raises the risk that trade will be restricted in the name of environmentalism but in the
service ofprotectionism. ... Logically, laborrights and standards are development and political issues,
not trade issues. There is no evidence thattrade undermines labor standards andleads to an international
'race to the bottom.' In fact, the opposite is true.
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process and public relations, and to involve less-developed members
more confidently within the global economic system.
(4) Faced with this insecurity and backlash, U.S. corporations can- no
longer afford to be complacent about their business opportunities
abroad or their political invulnerability at home. If protectionism
increases in the United States, so will reaction against U.S. exports and
U.S. investments abroad. If U.S. citizens feel threatened by economic
globalization, they will act out their insecurity against the U.S.
corporations that they demonize as globalization's henchmen.
This is the ultimate lesson of Seattle. The world has entered a period of
protectionist backlash against economic globalization. As a result, this
is a time when U.S. corporations with transnational operations must
learn to be wary and wise.
